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the assumption that equity prices, housing prices, import prices, exports, and
random shocks are not. Each of the 214 eight-quarter periods within the
overall 1954:1￿2009:1 period is examined regarding predictions of output
growth and in￿ation. The results for low output growth vary by recession￿
there is no common pattern. Of the eight recessions, three are forecast well.
For four of the ￿ve that are not, the main reason for each is not knowing:
1) the random shocks, 2) import prices and equity prices, 3) exports, and 4)
exports and equity prices. For the ￿fth￿the last one￿all ￿ve components
are large contributors, including housing prices: a perfect storm.
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes how well recessions and booms can be forecast. It uses a
structuralmacroeconometricmodeloftheUnitedStates,denotedthe￿USmodel.￿ 1
If recessions and booms are primarily driven by changes in asset prices, they are
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; email: ray.fair@yale.edu; website:
http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu.
1The US model is described in Fair (2004). It has been updated for purposes of this paper. The
updatedversionanddocumentationareonthewebsitementionedintheintroductoryfootnote. The
model can also be downloaded for use on one’s own computer, and the results in this paper can
be duplicated. The US model is imbedded in a larger multicountry model, but for purposes of this
paper only the US model has been used.unforecastable to the extent that changes in asset prices are unforecastable. There
arefourvariablesintheUSmodelthathaveimportanteffectsonaggregatedemand
that are unforecastable or at least hard to forecast: equity prices, housing prices,
import prices, and exports. Equity prices and housing prices are asset prices and
hard to forecast. Import prices depend in large part on oil prices, food prices, and
exchangerates,allofwhicharehardtoforecast. U.S.exportsdependontheimport
demands of other countries, and these demands are hard to forecast to the extent
that they depend on the importing countries’ asset and import prices.
The approach of this paper is to use the US model to forecast each of the 214
eight-quarter periods within the overall 1954:1￿2009:1 period under ￿ve assump-
tions: not knowing equity prices, not knowing housing prices, not knowing import
prices, not knowing exports, and not knowing the residuals (i.e., the error terms
in the structural equations). ￿Not knowing￿ the four variables means using simple
baseline paths for their forecasts. ￿Not knowing￿ the residuals means using zero
values. As will be seen, this procedure allows the overall forecast error for any
eight-quarter period to be divided into ￿ve components, which can then be exam-
ined. If the overall forecast error for a particular recession is small, the model has
forecast the recession well using only baseline paths and zero residuals. This says
that given the structure of the model, the initial conditions, and the values of the
other exogenous variables (primarily government policy variables), the recession
has been forecast. Otherwise, one or more of the components is the culprit.
There is a large literature on forecasting the probability that a recession will
occur in some future quarter, in particular using the yield curve to forecast such
probabilities. Two recent papers are Chauvet and Potter (2005) and Rudebusch
2and Williams (2008). For example, Rudebusch and Williams de￿ne a recession
as a quarter with negative real growth and examine horizons of zero to four quar-
ters ahead. They ￿nd that the yield curve has some predictive power relative to
predictions from professional forecasters.
There is also a large literature, recently surveyed by Stock and Watson (2003),
examining whether asset prices are useful predictors of future output growth and
in￿ation. StockandWatsonexaminedataonmanypossiblepredictorvariablesfor
seven countries. Using bivariate and trivariate equations, they get mixed results.
For some countries and some periods some asset prices are useful predictors, but
the predictive relations are far from stable.
This paper is not an examination of possible single-equation predictive rela-
tionships. Instead, a structural model of the economy, which has already been
estimated, is used. Consider, for example, the role of equity prices. In the US
model household wealth lagged one quarter is a signi￿cant and important ex-
planatory variable in the estimated consumption equations. If equity prices rise,
household wealth increases, which leads to an increase in consumption demand.
Equity prices are thus estimated in the model to affect aggregate demand. These
relationships have been estimated and found to be statistically signi￿cant. This
paper is not a test of them. The aim is to see how the US model’s forecasts are
affected by knowing or not knowing the path of equity prices over the forecast
period. The same is true for housing prices, import prices, and exports. These
variables are estimated to have important effects on the economy, and the aim is
to see how the model’s forecasts are affected by knowing or not knowing them.
This study is thus conditional on the estimated structure of the US model.
3Using the model allows questions to be considered that cannot be using single-
equation relationships. If the model is a good approximation of the economy, it
may still not be good at, say, forecasting recessions if what drives recessions are
unforecastable exogenous variables in the model, and this type of question can be
considered. More economic theory is used than in the use of single equations. A
disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a particular model. If the model is
a poor approximation of the economy, the results will not be trustworthy. The US
model is brie￿y discussed in the next section and in the appendix.
The basic procedure is as follows. A ￿baseline￿ path is chosen for each of the
four variables, which is a path based on the variable’s average historical behavior.
For each of the 214 eight-quarter periods within the overall 1954:1￿2009:1 period
a baseline forecast is made using the baseline paths of the four variables, zero
residuals, and actual values of all the other exogenous variables. Let ˆ yt be the
predicted value of endogenous variable yt for the forecast that begins in quarter
t. For this paper the two endogenous variables examined are the growth rate of
real GDP over the eight quarters and the in￿ation rate over the eight quarters (both
at annual rates). (Figures 1 and 2 plot these two variables for the 1954:1￿2009:1
period.) Let ˆ et = ˆ yt − yt denote the forecast error for the given variable. This
error will be called the ￿baseline￿ error.
Five more forecasts for each eight-quarter period are then made. For the ￿rst
forecast the residuals are kept at zero but the values of the four variables are set to
theiractualvalues. Theerrorfromthisforecastmeasureshowmuchofthebaseline
error is due to not knowing the residuals (i.e., the random shocks to the estimated



























5(i.e., estimated) values, the baseline path for equity prices is used, and actual
values for the other three variables are used. The error from this forecast measures
how much of the baseline error is due to not knowing equity prices. The third,
fourth, and ￿fth forecasts are similar to the second, where the selected variable is,
respectively, housing prices, import prices, and exports.
Let ˆ eit denote the forecast error for forecast i, i = 1,...,5. It turns out, as
will be seen, that the sum of these ￿ve errors is very close to ˆ et. So this proce-
dure essentially divides up the baseline error into ￿ve components: not knowing
the residuals, not knowing equity prices, not knowing housing prices, not know-
ing import prices, and not knowing exports. This paper is an analysis of these
components for the eight-quarter periods.
2 Background
The US Model
In the appendix the US model is brie￿y compared to dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium(DSGE)models,whicharecurrentlypopularinmacroeconomics. The
US model consists of 26 estimated equations and about 100 identities. If the error
terms are serially correlated, the serial correlation coef￿cients are estimated along
with the structural coef￿cients. The error terms after removing possible serial
correlation are assumed to be iid. The estimation period is 1954:1￿2009:1, and
the estimation method is two stage least squares. All the coef￿cient estimates are
consistent under the statistical assumptions. There is no calibration; labor market
6clearing is not imposed; and rational expectations are not imposed.
There are seven estimated demand equations for good and services, explaining
the demand for service consumption, nondurable consumption, durable consump-
tion, housing investment, plant and equipment investment, inventory investment,
and imports. The main way that equity prices and housing prices affect demand is
through a household wealth variable in the three consumption equations. Import
prices affect the demand for imports through an import price variable in the import
equation. Lagged stock variables are important explanatory variables in the de-
mand equations: durables goods stock, housing stock, capital stock, and inventory
stock.
There are labor force participation equations for prime age men, prime age
women, and all others, and there is an equation explaining the number of people
holding two jobs. There is a demand for employment equation and a demand for
hours worked per worker equation. The unemployment rate is determined by a
de￿nition: total labor force minus employment divided by total labor force.
Theothermainestimatedequationsareapriceequation, anominalwageequa-
tion, an interest rate rule of the Federal Reserve, a term structure equation ex-
plaining the AAA corporate bond rate, and a term structure equation explaining a
mortgage rate. The import price variable is an important explanatory variable in
the price equation; it plays the role of a cost shock variable.
The remaining estimated equations are two demand for money equations and
equationsexplainingdividends,￿rminterestpayments,federalgovernmentinterest
payments, depreciation, and unemployment bene￿ts. In the identities, all ￿ows of
funds among the sectors (household, ￿rm, ￿nancial, state and local government,
7federal government, and foreign) are accounted for.
Equity Prices
The variable CG in the model is the nominal value of capital gains or losses on the
equityholdingsofthehouseholdsector. ItisbasedondatafromtheFlowofFunds
accounts. There is an equation in the US model explaining CG, and it has been
dropped for purposes of this paper. The left hand side variable in this equation
is CG/(PX−1 · Y S−1), where PX is a price de￿ator and Y S is an estimate of
potential output. The two right hand side variables are the change in the bond rate
and the change in after tax pro￿ts (normalized by PX−1 · Y S−1). This equation
explains very little of the variation in CG, and the two explanatory variables have
very small effects on CG. The equation has been dropped so that CG can be used
in the experiments.
The mean of CG/(PX−1 · Y S−1) over the 1954:1￿2009:1 period is 0.120.
For the experiments in this paper the baseline values of CG were computed using
the equation CG = 0.120(PX−1 · Y S−1). This captures the average historical
behavior of CG.
As noted above, real wealth of the household sector (lagged one quarter) is an
important explanatory variable in the three consumption equations. The wealth
variable that appears in the consumption equations is
AA = [(AH + MH) + (PKH · KH)]/PH
where AH is the nominal value of net ￿nancial assets of the household sector
excluding demand deposits and currency, MH is the nominal value of demand
8depositsandcurrencyheldbythehouseholdsector, KH istherealstockofhousing,
PKH is the market price of KH, and PH is a price de￿ator relevant to household
spending. AH+MH isthusnominal￿nancialwealth,and PKH·KH isnominal
housing wealth.
The identity for AH is
AH = AH−1 − (MH − MH−1) + SH + CG − DISH
where SH is the ￿nancial saving of the household sector and DISH is an exoge-
nous discrepancy term. CG thus affects real wealth through this de￿nition. In
fact, the main ￿uctuations in AH are due to ￿uctuations in CG.
Figure 3 plots log(AH + MH)/(PH · Y ∗) for 1954:1￿2009:1, where Y ∗ is a
peak-to-peakinterpolationofrealGDP.( Y ∗ isjustusedfornormalizationpurposes
here; it is not a variable in the model.) Dominating the ￿gure are the stock market
booms of 1995￿1999 and 2003￿2006 and the stock market contractions of 2000￿
2002 and 2007￿2008. There were also two fairly large contractions in 1969￿1970
and 1973￿1974. Most of these ￿uctuations are driven by changes in CG. Using
the baseline values of CG essentially eliminates these ￿uctuations. The forecasts
using the baseline values of CG are thus forecasts with no stock market booms
and contractions.
Housing Prices
The real stock of housing of the household sector, KH, is based on data from the
Department of Commerce, Fixed Assets, Table 15. The market value of real estate











Table B.100. PKH, the market price of KH, is this market value of real estate
divided by KH. The relative price of KH is taken to be PKH/PD, where PD
is the price de￿ator for domestic goods. Let PSI14 = PKH/PD denote this
relative price. Then in the model PKH is determined as PKH = PSI14 · PD,
where PSI14istakentobeexogenous. Thissimplymeansthat PKH, themarket
price of KH, is not explained in the model except as it changes with the overall
price of domestic goods.
10WhenPSI14increases,nominalhousingwealth, PKH·KH,increases,which
leadstoanincreaseintheabovewealthvariable AAthatisanexplanatoryvariable
in the three consumption equations. Housing wealth, like ￿nancial wealth, affects
aggregate demand through the wealth effect on consumption.
The mean of logPSI14 − logPSI14−1 over the 1954:1￿2009:1 period is
0.00266, which says that the growth rate of PSI14 has been about 1.1 percent at
an annual rate. For the experiments in this paper the baseline values of PSI14
were computed using the equation logPSI14 = logPSI14−1 + 0.00266. This
captures the average historical behavior of PSI14.
Figure 4 plots log(PKH · KH)/(PH · Y ∗) for 1954:1￿2009:1. Dominating
the ￿gure are the huge increase in housing prices between 1998 and 2006 and the
rapid fall in 2007￿2009. There are also noticeable increases in 1977￿1979 and
1984￿1987 and a noticeable decrease in 1990￿1993. Using the baseline values of
PSI14 essentially eliminates these ￿uctuations.
Import Prices
Variable PIM in the US model is the U.S. import price de￿ator. It is exogenous
in the US model. It is endogenous when the US model is imbedded in the overall
multicountry model, mentioned in footnote 1, because it depends on the export
prices of the other countries and on exchange rates, both of which are endogenous
except for the export prices of oil exporting countries. For present purposes PIM
is taken to be exogenous.
Themeanof logPIM−logPIM−1 overthe1954:1￿2009:1periodis0.00752,













rate. For the experiments in this paper the baseline values of PIM were computed
using the equation logPIM = logPIM−1 + 0.00752. This captures the average
historical behavior of PIM.
A property of the US model is that positive price shocks, like an increase in
PIM, are contractionary. If there is a positive price shock, the domestic price
level rises faster than does the nominal wage rate, and so, other things being
equal, the real wage (and real income) falls. In addition, real wealth falls, other
12things being equal. Also, in the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed, the Fed
is estimated to respond to an increase in in￿ation, other things being equal, by
raising nominal interest rates, which is contractionary. 2 Because an increase in
PIM is both in￿ationary and contractionary, the model, other things being equal,
will underpredict in￿ation and overpredict output when the actual values of PIM
are greater than the baseline values.
Figure 5 plots logPIM for 1954:1￿2009:1. PIM grew rapidly between 1970
and 1981 and was essentially ￿at before and after. PIM is an unusual macroe-
conomic variable in that most of its change is con￿ned to one period. There were
also, however, a fairly large increase between 2007:4 and 2008:3 and a fairly large
decrease between 2008:3 and 2009:1.
Exports
Variable EX in the US model is the real value of U.S. exports. It is exogenous
in the US model and endogenous when the US model is imbedded in the overall
multicountry model. For present purposes it has been taken to be exogenous.
The mean of logEX − logEX−1 over the 1954:1￿2008:4 period is 0.0144,
whichsaysthatthegrowthrateof EX hasbeenabout5.8percentatanannualrate.
For the experiments in this paper the baseline values of EX were computed using
the equation logEX = logEX−1 + 0.0144. This captures the average historical
behavior of EX.
Figure 6 plots log(EX/Y ∗) for 1954:1￿2009:1. There is a positive trend in
2Consumption in the model responds to nominal, not real, interest rates. I have done extensive
tests of nominal versus real interest rates in consumption equations, and nominal interest rates

















14the ratio of exports to GDP over this period. The periods of noticeable decreases
are 1957￿1958, 1981￿1982, 2000￿2001, and 2008:3￿2009:1.
Other Exogenous Variables
Foralltheexperimentsinthispaperactualvalueshavebeenusedfortheexogenous
variables in the model except for the four variables discussed above. The main
exogenous variables are population variables, tax rate and spending variables of
thestateandlocalgovernmentsandthefederalgovernment,andalongrunproduc-
tivity term. The productivity term is computed from peak-to-peak interpolations
of output per labor hour. Demographic variables are thus exogenous, and ￿scal
policyvariablesareexogenous. Monetarypolicy,ontheotherhand,isendogenous
because of the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed.
Treating the Four Variables as Exogenous
Fornoneoftheforecastsinthispaperistherefeedbackfromtheeconomytoequity
prices, housing prices, import prices, and exports. Either actual values are used or
values from baseline paths. As noted above, there is an equation in the US model
explaining CG that has been dropped. Also, in the multicountry model in which
the US model is embedded PIM and EX are endogenous. In the estimation of
the US model these variables are treated as endogenous (using 2SLS), and so the
coef￿cient estimates are consistent. For the forecasts, however, any feedback has
been ignored. Although ignoring feedback has some effect on the results, this
effect is likely to be small. For example, in the CG equation the estimated effects
of the economy on CG are very small, and the equation explains very little of the
15variance. In the multicountry model exchange rates have an important effect on
PIM, and the estimated exchange rate equations in the model explain little of
the variance and have small estimated effects of the economy on exchange rates.
Regarding exports, the effect of the U.S. economy on the import demands of other
countries is small, and so the feedback of the U.S. economy on EX is small. The
fact that the feedback effects of the economy on the four variables are likely to be
small is evident from Figures 3￿6. It is unlikely that these paths can be explained
well using business-cycle macroeconomic variables.
Another way of thinking about Figures 3￿6 is to ask whether any time series
equations of a few parameters could approximate them well? For example, could
one ￿nd an equation which would pass structural stability tests for different sub
periods? The argument here is that this seems unlikely.
3 The Six Forecasts per Eight-Quarter Period
The Experiments
There are 214 eight-quarter periods within the 1954:1￿2009:1 period, and so 214
forecasts were made per each experiment. Results are presented for two variables,
the growth rate (at an annual rate) of real GDP over the eight quarters and the
in￿ation rate (at an annual rate) over the eight quarters. The price de￿ator used in
computingthein￿ationrateistheGDPde￿ator. Resultsforalloftheeight-quarter
periods are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Tables 1 and 2 present
a subset of these results￿those relating to recessions and booms.
16Table 1
Error Components for Output Growth: Selected Observations from Table A1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 7 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
Small growth rates (recessions)
1. 1958.2 -0.20 2.00 2.20 1.56 0.25 0.04 -0.15 0.53 2.23
2. 1961.2 1.66 0.96 -0.70 -0.32 0.22 -0.01 -0.09 -0.45 -0.65
3. 1970.4 0.91 1.18 0.27 -0.57 0.92 0.00 0.07 -0.20 0.22
4. 1975.2 -1.00 3.10 4.10 0.20 0.65 0.23 2.66 0.20 3.94
5. 1983.1 -0.51 1.23 1.73 -0.15 0.44 -0.07 -0.68 2.22 1.76
6. 1991.3 0.76 1.23 0.46 0.32 0.30 0.17 -0.01 -0.34 0.44
7. 2002.2 0.93 2.96 2.03 -0.64 1.01 -0.19 -0.52 2.35 2.01
8. 2009.1 -0.07 4.52 4.60 1.90 0.75 0.60 0.52 0.96 4.74
Large growth rates (booms)
1. 1956.2 4.97 4.32 -0.64 0.14 -0.25 -0.05 -0.16 -0.23 -0.56
2. 1960.1 6.24 4.19 -2.05 -1.19 -0.21 -0.04 -0.22 -0.30 -1.95
3. 1966.1 6.91 7.21 0.30 0.29 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.16 0.33
4. 1973.2 5.87 5.35 -0.51 0.03 -0.25 -0.08 0.36 -0.57 -0.51
5. 1978.4 5.86 5.34 -0.52 -1.04 0.21 -0.14 0.55 -0.11 -0.53
6. 1984.4 6.64 6.35 -0.30 0.35 0.14 -0.01 -0.58 -0.14 -0.25
7. 2000.2 4.63 3.41 -1.23 -0.29 -0.52 -0.08 -0.17 -0.11 -1.16
• t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
• GDPR = real GDP.
• yt = 100[(GDPRt+7/GDPRt−1).5 − 1].
• MAE for the 214 observations: 1.025 for ˆ et and 0.685 for ˆ e1t.
• NBER trough quarters: 1958:2, 1961:1, 1970:4, 1975:1, 1982:4, 1991:1, 2001:4.
Column 1 in the tables lists the last quarter of the eight-quarter forecast period.
Column 2 presents the actual value of the growth rate or the in￿ation rate. For
the ￿rst experiment the residuals are set to zero and the baseline values of the four
variables are used. Column 3 presents the predicted value from this forecast, and
column 4 presents the forecast error￿the baseline error.
For the second experiment the residuals are set to zero and the actual values
of the four variables are used. Column 5 presents the error from this forecast.
This is the error from not knowing the residuals but knowing everything else.
17The third experiment the residuals are set to their actual (i.e., estimated) values,
baseline values are used for CG, and actual values are used for the other three
variables. Column 6 presents the error from this forecast. This is the error from
not knowing equity prices. For the fourth experiment the residuals are set to their
actual values, baseline values are used for PSI14, and actual values are used for
the others. Column 7 presents the error from this forecast. This is the error from
not knowing housing prices. For the ￿fth experiment the residuals are set to their
actual values, baseline values are used for PIM, and actual values are used for
the others. Column 8 presents the error from this forecast. This is the error from
not knowing import prices. Finally, for the sixth experiment the residuals are set
to their actual values, baseline values are used for EX, and actual values are used
for the others. Column 9 presents the error from this forecast. This is the error
from not knowing exports. Column 10 is the sum of columns 5 through 9.
The tables show that for each period the value in column 4, the baseline error,
is close to the value in column 10, the sum of the ￿ve components. The ￿ve errors
in columns 5 through 9 can thus be considered to be components of the baseline
error in column 4. Note also that there is a high degree of serial correlation going
down the columns in Tables A1 and A2 because of the overlapping eight-quarter
forecast periods.
Mean Absolute Errors
The mean absolute error of the baseline error (column 4) for the 214 observations
inTableA1(eight-quartergrowthrateatanannualrate)is1.025percentagepoints.
This error is based on not knowing the residuals and not knowing the actual values
18of the four variables. The mean absolute error of the error in column 5 is 0.685
percentagepoints. Thisistheerrorbasedonnotknowingtheresidualsbutknowing
the actual values of the four variables. These mean absolute errors give some idea
of how accurate the US model is, but they must be interpreted with caution. The
1.025 error could be either too low or too high regarding what could be expected
in a real-time forecasting situation. It is too low in that it is based on coef￿cients
estimated through 2009:1, and in practice the model can only be estimated up to
the beginning of the forecast period. It is also too low in that it is based on actual
valuesofalltheexogenousvariablesexceptthefourinquestion,andinpracticeone
does not know these values exactly. It is too high in that it is based on the baseline
valuesofthefourvariables, andinpracticeonemaybeabletodoonaveragebetter
than this. The 0.685 error, on the other hand, can probably be considered a lower
bound for what can be expected in a real-time forecasting situation. It requires
knowledge of all the exogenous variables, including the four in question, and is
based on coef￿cients estimated through 2009:1. Whatever the case, the following
results are based on knowledge of the coef￿cients estimated through 2009:1 and
on knowledge of all the exogenous variables except the selected four. 3
The mean absolute error of the baseline error (column 4) for the 214 observa-
tions in Table A2 (eight-quarter in￿ation rate at an annual rate) is 1.130 percentage
points. Again, thiserrorisbasedonnotknowingtheresidualsandnotknowingthe
actual values of the four variables. The mean absolute error of the error in column
5 is 0.720 percentage points.
3Also, the latest revised data are used for this work, not the actual data that existed at the time.
In addition, the speci￿cation of the model is the latest one, which would not have been known, say,
at the beginning of 1954.
19Results for Output Growth
Table 1 contains selected observations from Table A1. Observations were selected
that had the smallest actual growth rates (recessions) and the largest actual growth
rates (booms). The recession observations were chosen as follows. The actual
growth rates were ranked, and observations were chosen working from the bottom
up with the restriction that a previous observation had not been chosen within 12
quarters of the observation in question. In other words, a window of at least 12
quarters was used. The same procedure was followed for booms, working from
the top down.
The last quarter for each recession observation in Table 1 is close to the trough
quarter of an NBER designated recession, as noted in the footnote to the table.
However, the NBER designated two recessions in the early 1980s, 1980:1￿1980:3
and 1981:3￿1982:4, whereas in this paper this period is considered to be one
long recession. The worst eight-quarter period within this overall period ended in
1983:1, which had a growth rate of -0.51 percent, and this is the period used in
Table 1. In the following discussion the recessions and booms will be denoted by
the last quarter of the eight-quarter period.
Tolstoysaidthat￿Happyfamiliesareallalike;everyunhappyfamilyisunhappy
in its own way.￿ If we substitute ￿booms￿ for ￿happy families￿ and ￿recessions￿
for ￿unhappy families,￿ this summarizes the results in Table 1 fairly well. The
recessions are different. Three￿1961:2, 1970:4, and 1991:3￿are forecast fairly
well. The baseline errors are smaller than the mean absolute error. This says that
knowing the model, the initial conditions, and the exogenous variables other than
20the four (again, primarily government policy variables), these three recessions are
forecastable. For the 1961:2 and 1991:3 recessions the components are all fairly
small. For the 1970.4 recession the equity component of 0.92 percentage points is
somewhat offset by the residual component of -0.57.
The baseline errors for the other ￿ve recessions vary between 1.73 and 4.60
percentagepoints. The1958:2recessionisdominatedbytheresidualcomponent￿
unexplained shocks to the structural equations. The error in forecasting this reces-
sion is thus primarily failure to know the random errors. The PIM component
dominates the 1975:2 recession (2.66 percentage points), with the equity compo-
nent second at 0.65 percentage points. This was a period of sharply rising import
prices, which according to the model is contractionary, and not knowing this rise
led the model to substantially overpredict output. Also, the stock market was
falling, and not knowing this led the model to overpredict. Failure to forecast the
1975:2 recession is thus primarily the failure to forecast import and equity prices.
The 1983:1 and 2002:2 recessions are dominated by the EX component (2.22
and 2.35 percentage points respectively). In both cases this is partly offset by
the PIM component (-0.68 and -0.52 percentage points respectively). For the
2002:2 recession the are also two other fairly large offsetting components: 1.01
percentage points for the equity component and -0.64 percentage points for the
residual component. The results for the 2002:2 recession are consistent with the
results in Fair (2005), which suggest that the sluggish performance of the U.S.
economy in this period in spite of expansive monetary and ￿scal policies was due
in large part to the stock market decline and to exports.
The2009:1recessionhasthelargestbaselineerror(4.60percentagepoints),and
21eachofthe￿vecomponentsisanoticeablecontributor. Thisistheonlyrecessionin
which all ￿ve contribute in a fairly large way. One might call it a ￿perfect storm￿
recession. The percentage points are: 1.90 residual, 0.75 equity, 0.60 housing,
0.52 PIM, and 0.96 EX. This is the only recession in which housing plays a
large role. The large residual component could possibly be negative shocks to the
demand equations due to borrowing constraints caused by the ￿nancial crisis, but
there is no way to identify this in the model. 4
The booms are not as different. Five of the seven (all but 1960:1 and 2000:2)
areforecastfairlywellinthatthebaselineerrorsaresmallerthanthemeanabsolute
error. The baseline error for the 1960:1 boom is -2.05 percentage points, of which
-1.19 is from the residual component. The baseline error for the 2000:2 boom is
-1.23 percentage points, of which -0.52 is from the equity component. The results
forthe2000:2boomareconsistentwiththeresultsinFair(2004,Chapter4),which
suggest that the rapid growth of the U.S. economy in the last half of the 1990s (the
￿new economy￿) was primarily due to the stock market boom. In general, booms
are not nearly as problematic as recessions from a forecastability point of view.
The detailed results in Table A1 show that the import price component is most
important in the mid 1970s. The equity component is generally modest in size
until the mid 1990s. The housing component increases in size from about 2000
4Hamilton(2009,p. 40)arguesthathadtherebeennooilshockin2007￿2008,theU.S.economy
in 2007:4￿2008:3 would not have gone into a recession. His results are not based on a structural
model,andsotheyarenotdirectlycomparabletothepresentresults. HeusesvariousVARequations
and an equation with GDP growth on the left hand side and on the right hand side four lags of GDP
growth and four lags of an oil price increase variable. Also, his period ends in 2008:3 rather than
2009:1 here, and 2008:4 and 2009:1 are extreme in their large negative growth rates in absolute
value. The results in Table 1 show that for the 2009:1 recession the import-price component
contributes 11 percent (0.52/4.60) to the overall error.
22on. These are as expected given the rise in import prices in the 1970s, the stock
marketvolatilitybeginninginthemid1990s,andhousingpricevolatilitybeginning
about 2000.
Regarding the Great Depression, Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro (1988) show
that forecasters did not see it coming and that a VAR model using historical data
now available also does not forecast it. A structural model was not tried in this
paper, and so components of the overall forecast error are not available. The US
model cannot be used for this purpose because it is based on data beginning in
1952. In future work, however, it might be interesting to see if a structural model
￿t through the 1920s and 1930s could determine the components of the overall
forecast error.
Results for In￿ation
Table 2 contains selected observations from Table A2. Observations were selected
that had the largest in￿ation rates and the smallest in￿ation rates. The actual
in￿ation rates were ranked, and observations were chosen working from the top
down and the bottom up with at least a 12 quarter window. Three large in￿ation
periods (ending in 1971:2, 1975:1, and 1981:1) and four small in￿ation periods
(ending in 1960:4, 1963:3, 1999:1, and 2003:2) were chosen.
The three large in￿ation periods are all underpredicted, with baseline errors of
-2.39, -4.15, and -3.38 percentage points respectively. The ￿rst is primarily due to
the residual component (-2.49), and the other two are primarily due to the PIM
component (-4.17 and -2.77). Not knowing the large increase in PIM between
1970 and 1981 is thus the main reason for underpredicting the large in￿ation in
23Table 2
Error Components for In￿ation: Selected Observations from Table A2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 7 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
Large in￿ation rates
1971.2 5.33 2.95 -2.39 -2.49 0.40 0.01 -0.50 0.08 -2.50
1975.1 9.36 5.21 -4.15 -0.17 0.38 0.06 -4.17 -0.29 -4.18
1981.1 9.61 6.22 -3.38 -0.19 -0.14 -0.01 -2.77 -0.33 -3.45
Small in￿ation rates
1960.4 1.18 1.32 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.01 0.23 -0.48 0.21
1963.3 1.13 3.72 2.60 2.04 0.18 0.01 0.47 -0.07 2.63
1999.1 1.19 1.58 0.39 -0.61 -0.29 -0.01 1.40 -0.03 0.46
2003.2 1.83 2.70 0.88 -0.43 0.24 -0.03 0.66 0.47 0.90
• t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
• GDPD = GDP de￿ator.
• yt = 100[(GDPDt+7/GDPDt−1).5 − 1].
• MAE for the 214 observations: 1.130 for ˆ et and 0.720 for ˆ e1t.
the second and third periods.
Three of the four small in￿ation periods are forecast fairly well, with baseline
errors of 0.14, 0.39, and 0.88 percentage points. The only large error is for 1963:3,
with a baseline error of 2.60 percentage points, where 2.04 is from the residual
component and 0.47 from the PIM component.
Robustness Checks
The above forecasts are based on the US model estimated through 2009:1 and
are thus within sample forecasts. As discussed in Section 3, this study is not an
attempttomimicwhatisknowninareal-timeforecastingsituation. Toseewhether
the above results are sensitive to the estimation of the model through 2009:1, the
following check was made. The model was estimated through 1983:2 and used to
forecast1983:3￿1985:2. Itwasthenestimatedthrough1983:3andusedtoforecast
241983:4￿1985:3. This was repeated to the end, where the last estimate was through
2007:2 and the last forecast was for 2007:3￿2009:1. This generates 96 outside
sample forecasts. The results are presented in Table 3 for output growth and in
Table 4 for in￿ation. The results in Tables 3 and 4 differ from those in Tables 1
and2becausethecoef￿cientestimatesaredifferentandtheestimatedresidualsare
different (being based on different coef￿cient estimates). The exogenous variable
values are the same, including the baseline values. The outside sample forecasts
are not forecasts that could have been made in real time. They are simply used
here to examine the sensitive of the results to alternative coef￿cient estimates.
For output growth the mean absolute error for the 96 observations for the
outside sample forecasts is 1.048 for the baseline error and 0.759 for the residual
component. These compare to 1.078 and 0.622 for the within sample forecasts.
For in￿ation the respective mean absolute errors for the outside sample forecasts
are 0.989 and 0.837, which compare to 0.614 and 0.503 for the within sample
errors. The output growth errors are thus fairly close, but there is some loss of
accuracy for the in￿ation errors for the outside sample forecasts.
The key question is how different the results in Tables 3 and 4 are from those
in Tables 1 and 2. The results are in fact similar. For output growth in Table 3 the
2009:1recessionisstillaffectedbyall￿vecomponentsandthe2002:2recessionis
still affected most by the EX component and the equity component. The baseline
errorforthe1991:3recessionislarger(althoughstillsmallerthanthemeanabsolute




Error Components for Output Growth: Outside Sample Forecasts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 7 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
Small growth rates (recessions)
6. 1991.3 0.76 1.75 0.98 0.80 0.35 0.14 -0.05 -0.27 0.98
7. 2002.2 0.93 3.11 2.18 -0.22 0.92 -0.15 -0.39 2.02 2.18
8. 2009.1 -0.07 5.68 5.75 3.55 0.52 0.43 0.44 0.98 5.93
Large growth rates (booms)
7. 2000.2 4.63 3.55 -1.08 -0.16 -0.58 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -1.05
• t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
• GDPR = real GDP.
• yt = 100[(GDPRt+7/GDPRt−1).5 − 1].
• MAE for the 96 observations: 1.048 for ˆ et and 0.759 for ˆ e1t.
• NBER trough quarters: 1958:2, 1961:1, 1970:4, 1975:1, 1982:4, 1991:1, 2001:4.
Table 4
Error Components for In￿ation: Outside Sample Forecasts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 7 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
Small in￿ation rates
1999.1 1.19 1.95 0.76 -0.17 -0.43 -0.02 1.44 -0.01 0.81
2003.2 1.83 3.23 1.40 0.10 0.24 -0.04 0.70 0.42 1.43
• t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
• GDPD = GDP de￿ator.
• yt = 100[(GDPDt+7/GDPDt−1).5 − 1].
• MAE for the 96 observations: 0.989 for ˆ et and 0.837 for ˆ e1t.
the largest for both periods. The general conclusions are thus not sensitive to the
use of within sample forecasts.
Another check is to see if the results are sensitive to the choice of an eight-
quarter forecast period. To examine this, the calculations were repeated using a
￿ve-quarter period. There are 217 ￿ve-quarter periods within the overall 1954:1￿
2009:1 period. The results for output growth are presented in Table 5. Some
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Error Components for Output Growth: Five-Quarter Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 4 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
Small growth rates (recessions)
1. 1958.2 -1.98 1.59 3.57 1.61 0.17 0.01 -0.19 1.93 3.53
2. 1961.2 0.65 1.28 0.63 0.56 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.09 0.65
3. 1970.4 -0.52 -0.53 -0.02 -0.59 0.61 0.00 0.16 -0.22 -0.05
4. 1975.1 -2.49 3.28 5.77 1.90 0.55 0.36 2.47 0.32 5.59
5. 1982.4 -2.11 0.05 2.16 0.21 0.14 0.02 -0.38 2.15 2.14
6. 1991.2 -0.29 0.78 1.07 0.49 0.21 0.13 0.05 0.12 1.01
7. 2001.3 0.19 2.04 1.85 -0.60 0.71 -0.12 -0.24 2.09 1.84
8. 2009.1 -1.93 4.91 6.84 2.83 1.10 0.42 0.12 2.39 6.86
Large growth rates (booms)
1. 1955.3 7.33 5.15 -2.18 -1.89 -0.15 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 -2.14
2. 1959.2 8.01 4.83 -3.19 -2.63 -0.22 -0.05 -0.18 -0.07 -3.15
3. 1966.1 8.84 7.87 -0.96 -1.22 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.22 -0.97
4. 1973.1 7.62 5.69 -1.93 -0.53 -0.17 -0.07 0.25 -1.43 -1.96
5. 1978.2 6.52 4.70 -1.82 -2.00 0.07 -0.11 0.29 -0.09 -1.84
6. 1984.2 8.20 7.63 -0.58 -0.38 0.06 0.03 -0.22 -0.05 -0.55
7. 1999.4 5.00 3.15 -1.85 -0.43 -0.95 -0.06 -0.07 -0.24 -1.75
• t + 4 = last quarter of ￿ve-quarter prediction period.
• GDPR = real GDP.
• yt = 100[(GDPRt+4/GDPRt−1).8 − 1].
• MAE for the 217 observations: 1.306 for ˆ et and 0.963 for ˆ e1t.
• NBER trough quarters: 1958:2, 1961:1, 1970:4, 1975:1, 1982:4, 1991:1, 2001:4.
of the periods are slightly different because they were chosen using the ranking of
the￿ve-quartergrowthratesratherthantheeight-quarterrates. Themeanabsolute
errorforthebaselineerrorforthe217observationsis1.306percentagepoints. For
the residual component it is 0.963 percentage points.
The results between Tables 1 and 5 are again similar, and no major conclusions
are changed. Comparing Table 5 to Table 1, the main change for recessions is
that the residual component for the 1975:1 recession has increased and is now the
second largest component for this recession. The baseline errors for the 1961:2,
271970:4, and 1991:2 recessions remain smaller than the mean absolute error. For
booms the baseline errors and the residual components are all larger in absolute
value. Also, the EX component is larger in absolute value for the 1973:1 boom,
and the equity component is larger in absolute value for the 1999:4 boom.
4 Ex Ante Forecast Errors
It was mentioned in Section 3 that the mean absolute error for the residual compo-
nent is likely to be a lower bound on what can be achieved in real-time (ex ante)
forecasting situations. It is of interest to see if this is true. Two sets of ex ante
forecastsareusedforpresentpurposes. The￿rstisfromtheSurveyofProfessional
Forecasts (SPF), currently run by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Five-
quarter-ahead forecasts of real output growth and in￿ation are available beginning
in 1970:2.5 Median forecasts were used. There are 152 such forecasts given the
actual data ending in 2009:1. The second set is on the website mentioned in the
introductory footnote. I have made a real-time forecast using the US model each
quartersince1983:3. Theforecasthorizonisalwayslongerthaneightquarters,and
so eight-quarter-ahead forecasts are available. There are 96 such forecasts given
the actual data ending in 2009:1. There are also 99 ￿ve-quarter-ahead forecasts
available.
The latest revised actual values of the growth rate and in￿ation are used for
the following results. Results on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia￿Stark (2009)￿show that forecasting accuracy is somewhat sensi-
5I am indebted to Tom Stark for data on median forecasts of real growth rates prior to 1981:3.
28tive to the choice of actual values (￿rst release, second release, latest, etc.). If
forecasters are trying to forecast what the economy is actually going to do regard-
ing real growth and in￿ation and if the latest revised data are the best estimate of
what the economy actually did, then the use of the latest revised actual values is
justi￿ed. The assumption here, given the use of the latest data, is thus that fore-
casters are trying to forecast reality, not some preliminary estimate of reality. If
they are in fact trying to forecast some preliminary estimate, the following results
will be at least a little off.
Mean absolute errors (MAEs) are presented in Table 6. Eight-quarter-ahead
forecasts are available for the US model within sample (USws), the US model
outside sample (USos), and the US model ex ante (USea). 6 For USws and USos
there are MAEs for both the baseline error and the residual component. Results
for the eight-quarter-ahead forecasts are presented in the top half of Table 6. For
output growth the MAEs for USws don’t change much in moving from the larger
sample period to the common sample period, 1985:2￿2009:1. For the common
periodtheMAEforUSeaof0.821issmallerthantheMAEsforUSwsandUSosfor
the baseline error (1.078 and 1.048) and larger for the residual component (0.622
and 0.759). This is what would be expected from the discussion in Section 3.
For in￿ation there is a large decrease in the MAEs for USws in moving to the
common sample period. For the common period the MAE for USea of 0.777 is
larger than both MAEs for USws (0.614 and 0.503), but smaller than both MAEs
for USos (0.989 and 0.837). Considerable accuracy is lost in moving from USws
6Remember that the outside sample forecast are not ex ante forecasts. They were not made in
real time and are based on actual or baseline values of the exogenous variables.
29Table 6
Mean Absolute Errors￿Percentage Points
Eight-quarter growth rate Eight-quarter in￿ation rate
(annual rate) (annual rate)
USws USos USea USws USos USea
1955:4￿2009:1 1.025 − − 1.130 − −
214 obs. (0.685) (0.720)
1985:2￿2009:1 1.078 1.048 0.821 0.614 0.989 0.777
96 obs. (0.622) (0.759) (0.503) (0.837)
Five-quarter growth rate Five-quarter in￿ation rate
(annual rate) (annual rate)
USws USos USea SPFea USws USos USea SPFea
1955:1￿2009:1 1.306 − − − 1.045 − − −
217 obs. (0.963) (0.801)
1971:2￿2009:1 1.343 − − 1.274 0.929 − − 0.988
152 obs. (0.883) (0.669)
1984:3￿2009:1 1.279 1.334 1.000 1.124 0.602 1.015 0.698 0.724
99 obs. (0.804) (1.043) (0.583) (0.892)
• USws = within sample forecasts.
• USos = outside sample forecasts.
• USea = ex ante forecasts, US model.
• SPFea = ex ante forecasts, median SPF forecasts.
• Values for USws and USos not in parentheses are MAEs for baseline error.
• Values for USws and USos in parentheses are MAEs for residual component.
to USos, and USea is in between these two. These in￿ation comparisons have the
disadvantage that the common period does not include any of the period of the
large increases in PIM, and in this sense it is not a representative sample.
Results for the ￿ve-quarter-ahead forecasts are presented in the bottom half of
Table 6, where the ex ante forecasts from SPF are added (SPFea). There is now
a common sample period for USws versus SPFea of 1971:2￿2009:1. Again, for
output growth the MAEs for USws don’t change much in moving across the three
sample periods. For the ￿rst common period the MAE of 1.274 for SPFea is in
betweenthetwoMAEsforUSws, 1.343and0.883. Thisisalsotrueforthesecond
30common period for both USws and USos (1.124 for SPFea versus 1.279 and 0.804
for USws and 1.334 and 1.043 for USos). The MAE for USea is 1.000, and it
also ￿ts this pattern. So again, these results are as expected from the discussion in
Section 3, namely that the ex ante MAEs are in between the baseline error MAEs
and the residual component MAEs. Comparing the accuracy of the two ex ante
forecasts for the ￿ve-quarter-ahead forecasts and the common sample period, the
MAE for USea is slightly smaller than that for SPFea (1.000 versus 1.124).
For in￿ation there is a large decrease in the MAEs for USws in moving from
the ￿rst common period to the second. For the ￿rst common period the MAE
for SPFea is larger than both MAEs for USws. This is also true for the second
common period. For USos, on the other hand, the MAE for SPFea is smaller than
both MAEs for USos. The same is true for the MAE for USea. Again, the MAE
for USea is slightly smaller than the MAE for SPFea (0.698 versus 0.724).
Overall, the results for the growth rate are what would be expected, namely
that the accuracy of errors from ex ante forecasts is likely to be between that from
baseline errors and that from residual errors. This is not true for in￿ation, but the
common sample period may be a problem.
5 Conclusion
In the US model equity prices, housing prices, import prices, and exports have
important effects on the economy. If these variables are not forecast well for a
particularperiod, themodel’sforecastfortheperiod, otherthingsbeingequal, will
not be accurate. This paper compares forecasts from the model using actual values
31of the four variables versus using values from simple baseline paths. The baseline
error for a period can be separated into ￿ve components: not knowing each of
the four variables and not knowing the residuals. Can recessions and booms be
forecast using only baseline values for the four variables and zero residuals? The
answer is yes for some recessions and most booms. When the answer is no for a
recession, the reason or reasons vary by recession. The relative sizes of the ￿ve
components vary across recessions; there is no common pattern. The recession of
2009:1 is perhaps the most interesting in that each of the ￿ve components is large:
a perfect storm.
The analysis in this paper requires the use of a structural model. The model
must explain, for example, the effects of the four variables on the economy. Some
key effects in the US model are wealth effects in the consumption equations and
the effect of the import price variable in the price equation. An important property
of the overall model is that an increase in the price of imports is contractionary,
other things being equal.
The fact that there is no common pattern across recessions may explain why
single-equationexercisesdonotyieldstableresults. Onewouldnotexpectthereto
be stable single-equation forecasting relationships given the present results. The
macro economy is more complicated than this.
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Error Components for Output Growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 7 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
1955.4 4.59 2.82 -1.77 -1.10 -0.18 0.00 -0.08 -0.32 -1.67
1956.1 4.60 2.88 -1.72 -0.38 -0.23 -0.04 -0.15 -0.81 -1.62
1956.2 4.97 4.32 -0.64 0.14 -0.25 -0.05 -0.16 -0.23 -0.56
1956.3 4.33 4.62 0.29 1.41 -0.13 -0.03 -0.18 -0.67 0.40
1956.4 4.15 4.11 -0.04 1.07 -0.13 -0.02 -0.19 -0.67 0.06
1957.1 2.99 3.64 0.64 1.80 -0.17 -0.03 -0.08 -0.77 0.75
1957.2 2.03 2.58 0.54 1.85 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -1.12 0.63
1957.3 1.85 1.66 -0.20 0.54 0.10 0.00 -0.05 -0.74 -0.15
1957.4 1.05 0.90 -0.14 0.49 0.15 0.00 -0.05 -0.65 -0.06
1958.1 -0.10 1.53 1.63 1.52 0.33 0.02 -0.07 -0.14 1.67
1958.2 -0.20 2.00 2.20 1.56 0.25 0.04 -0.15 0.53 2.23
1958.3 1.00 2.86 1.86 0.92 0.23 0.04 -0.22 0.91 1.89
1958.4 1.34 3.69 2.35 0.92 0.33 0.03 -0.28 1.29 2.29
1959.1 1.99 3.08 1.08 -0.50 0.10 0.01 -0.35 1.75 1.01
1959.2 3.45 3.91 0.45 -0.73 0.11 0.02 -0.39 1.37 0.38
1959.3 2.91 2.62 -0.29 -0.76 -0.16 0.01 -0.39 1.00 -0.28
1959.4 3.64 2.72 -0.92 -1.04 -0.26 0.00 -0.33 0.73 -0.89
1960.1 6.24 4.19 -2.05 -1.19 -0.21 -0.04 -0.22 -0.30 -1.95
1960.2 5.67 3.67 -2.00 -0.93 -0.16 -0.03 -0.13 -0.60 -1.86
1960.3 4.55 3.42 -1.12 -0.28 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.76 -1.05
1960.4 2.69 2.37 -0.33 0.54 0.19 0.01 -0.06 -0.93 -0.25
1961.1 2.03 2.55 0.52 1.13 0.22 -0.04 -0.10 -0.63 0.59
1961.2 1.66 0.96 -0.70 -0.32 0.22 -0.01 -0.09 -0.45 -0.65
1961.3 2.52 1.47 -1.05 -0.75 0.12 0.00 -0.12 -0.28 -1.02
1961.4 3.38 2.38 -1.00 -0.46 0.17 0.01 -0.17 -0.53 -0.98
1962.1 3.16 3.26 0.10 0.08 -0.11 0.03 -0.16 0.26 0.10
1962.2 3.98 3.80 -0.19 -0.31 -0.18 0.00 -0.19 0.49 -0.18
1962.3 4.38 3.73 -0.65 -0.35 -0.33 0.00 -0.22 0.27 -0.63
1962.4 5.19 5.97 0.78 0.54 0.04 -0.01 -0.20 0.44 0.81
1963.1 5.56 6.57 1.01 0.61 0.30 -0.03 -0.23 0.34 0.98
1963.2 5.23 6.30 1.06 1.10 0.23 -0.01 -0.21 -0.05 1.06
1963.3 5.37 6.75 1.38 1.45 0.25 0.01 -0.18 -0.09 1.43
1963.4 4.71 6.72 2.01 1.84 0.36 0.03 -0.18 -0.06 1.98
1964.1 4.94 5.73 0.79 0.94 0.21 0.03 -0.07 -0.30 0.81
1964.2 4.98 5.64 0.66 1.12 -0.54 0.03 -0.06 0.13 0.67
1964.3 5.21 5.17 -0.04 0.88 -0.50 0.03 -0.02 -0.39 0.01
1964.4 5.22 5.62 0.40 1.21 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.71 0.46
1965.1 5.82 5.60 -0.22 0.21 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.40 -0.20
1965.2 5.87 6.37 0.50 0.41 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.11 0.50
1965.3 5.95 5.83 -0.12 0.18 0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.31 -0.08
1965.4 6.80 6.76 -0.05 0.29 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 -0.15 0.02
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
all resid equity housing PIM EX sum
t + 7 yt ˆ yt ˆ et ˆ e1t ˆ e2t ˆ e3t ˆ e4t ˆ e5t ˆ ˆ et
1966.1 6.91 7.21 0.30 0.29 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.16 0.33
1966.2 6.48 6.38 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.06 -0.09 0.12 -0.09
1966.3 6.11 6.32 0.21 0.20 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.23
1966.4 6.39 7.57 1.18 0.89 0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.18 1.17
1967.1 5.57 6.81 1.24 1.88 0.16 0.05 -0.08 -0.80 1.21
1967.2 4.87 7.54 2.68 2.22 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.46 2.68
1967.3 4.23 6.18 1.95 1.79 0.20 0.00 -0.05 0.03 1.98
1967.4 3.38 5.79 2.40 1.64 0.32 0.00 -0.09 0.49 2.36
1968.1 3.19 4.97 1.79 1.60 0.11 -0.04 -0.12 0.23 1.78
1968.2 3.88 4.53 0.66 0.41 -0.06 0.00 -0.16 0.48 0.68
1968.3 3.89 3.54 -0.35 0.36 -0.43 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 -0.26
1968.4 3.69 2.92 -0.77 -0.30 -0.33 -0.03 -0.15 0.07 -0.73
1969.1 4.05 3.42 -0.63 -0.68 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13 0.42 -0.60
1969.2 4.19 3.82 -0.37 0.05 -0.26 -0.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.31
1969.3 4.10 3.41 -0.69 -0.02 -0.17 -0.08 -0.05 -0.29 -0.62
1969.4 3.47 2.66 -0.80 -0.29 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.25 -0.71
1970.1 2.33 0.61 -1.72 -1.07 -0.28 -0.06 -0.01 -0.20 -1.62
1970.2 1.57 0.30 -1.27 -1.06 0.18 -0.05 0.00 -0.28 -1.21
1970.3 1.67 0.73 -0.94 -1.32 0.38 -0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.95
1970.4 0.91 1.18 0.27 -0.57 0.92 0.00 0.07 -0.20 0.22
1971.1 1.51 -0.41 -1.92 -1.64 0.80 0.02 0.13 -1.35 -2.03
1971.2 1.65 1.69 0.04 -1.20 0.66 0.02 0.20 0.22 -0.10
1971.3 1.74 2.04 0.30 -0.43 0.48 0.00 0.26 -0.07 0.24
1971.4 2.12 3.13 1.01 0.13 0.27 0.01 0.18 0.30 0.90
1972.1 3.11 3.66 0.55 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.21 0.21 0.49
1972.2 4.22 3.34 -0.89 -1.10 -0.60 0.00 0.23 0.49 -0.98
1972.3 4.26 4.28 0.02 -0.03 -0.43 -0.05 0.19 0.30 -0.02
1972.4 5.68 6.29 0.61 0.48 -0.25 -0.05 0.23 0.15 0.56
1973.1 5.55 5.53 -0.03 0.13 -0.12 -0.06 0.19 -0.17 -0.04
1973.2 5.87 5.35 -0.51 0.03 -0.25 -0.08 0.36 -0.57 -0.51
1973.3 5.17 4.78 -0.39 0.08 -0.35 -0.09 0.52 -0.54 -0.38
1973.4 5.52 4.32 -1.19 -0.01 -0.16 -0.11 0.73 -1.72 -1.27
1974.1 4.14 4.57 0.43 0.55 0.00 -0.09 1.05 -1.12 0.38
1974.2 3.08 3.06 -0.02 0.31 0.03 -0.09 1.41 -1.79 -0.13
1974.3 2.09 3.11 1.02 0.07 0.23 -0.01 1.97 -1.29 0.97
1974.4 1.07 4.17 3.10 0.59 0.78 0.12 2.45 -1.02 2.92
1975.1 -0.79 3.37 4.16 0.66 0.72 0.17 2.79 -0.37 3.98
1975.2 -1.00 3.10 4.10 0.20 0.65 0.23 2.66 0.20 3.94
1975.3 0.10 4.75 4.65 0.28 0.85 0.32 2.66 0.33 4.45
1975.4 0.28 5.22 4.94 0.89 0.46 0.36 2.28 0.71 4.70
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1976.1 1.84 4.77 2.92 0.19 0.32 0.20 1.21 0.79 2.70
1976.2 2.08 3.81 1.73 -0.20 0.03 0.07 0.35 1.29 1.55
1976.3 2.82 3.30 0.48 0.33 -0.41 -0.02 0.05 0.50 0.45
1976.4 3.39 3.43 0.04 -0.03 -0.40 -0.03 -0.06 0.61 0.09
1977.1 4.64 4.71 0.07 -0.22 -0.17 0.00 -0.10 0.66 0.17
1977.2 5.28 4.79 -0.49 -0.71 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.21 -0.46
1977.3 5.33 4.70 -0.63 -0.55 -0.24 -0.04 0.27 -0.06 -0.63
1977.4 4.64 4.62 -0.02 -0.80 -0.12 -0.07 0.42 0.52 -0.04
1978.1 3.65 3.56 -0.09 -0.94 0.06 -0.11 0.44 0.41 -0.14
1978.2 5.28 4.12 -1.16 -1.87 0.12 -0.07 0.48 0.10 -1.24
1978.3 5.54 4.25 -1.29 -2.01 0.14 -0.12 0.48 0.12 -1.40
1978.4 5.86 5.34 -0.52 -1.04 0.21 -0.14 0.55 -0.11 -0.53
1979.1 5.33 4.39 -0.93 -0.77 0.02 -0.14 0.43 -0.48 -0.94
1979.2 4.36 3.94 -0.42 -0.38 0.01 -0.11 0.39 -0.39 -0.47
1979.3 3.81 2.71 -1.10 -0.94 -0.08 -0.11 0.58 -0.56 -1.11
1979.4 3.96 3.32 -0.65 0.05 -0.17 -0.10 0.84 -1.32 -0.70
1980.1 3.96 3.89 -0.08 0.56 -0.30 -0.09 1.19 -1.46 -0.10
1980.2 0.94 2.96 2.02 1.54 -0.22 -0.08 1.46 -0.64 2.05
1980.3 0.36 2.24 1.88 1.06 -0.17 -0.07 1.81 -0.74 1.89
1980.4 0.63 1.87 1.25 -0.07 -0.28 -0.08 2.05 -0.43 1.20
1981.1 1.54 2.16 0.61 -0.68 -0.29 -0.01 2.14 -0.56 0.61
1981.2 1.10 1.11 0.01 -1.06 -0.32 0.02 2.00 -0.64 -0.01
1981.3 1.34 0.70 -0.64 -1.75 -0.27 0.01 1.57 -0.19 -0.64
1981.4 0.56 0.30 -0.26 -1.75 -0.22 0.00 1.11 0.53 -0.33
1982.1 -0.42 -0.62 -0.20 -1.47 -0.30 0.00 0.39 1.04 -0.34
1982.2 0.87 0.16 -0.71 -2.27 -0.08 0.01 0.07 1.40 -0.87
1982.3 0.76 1.84 1.08 -0.67 0.19 0.02 -0.19 1.64 0.99
1982.4 -0.12 1.92 2.03 0.12 0.42 -0.02 -0.38 1.85 1.99
1983.1 -0.51 1.23 1.73 -0.15 0.44 -0.07 -0.68 2.22 1.76
1983.2 1.00 2.49 1.49 -0.39 0.34 0.03 -0.85 2.40 1.52
1983.3 1.38 2.30 0.92 -0.60 0.05 0.05 -0.66 2.11 0.94
1983.4 3.06 3.25 0.19 -1.27 0.08 0.04 -0.78 2.09 0.16
1984.1 4.93 4.35 -0.58 -1.12 -0.13 0.08 -0.82 1.41 -0.58
1984.2 5.54 5.05 -0.49 -0.93 -0.19 0.07 -0.69 1.28 -0.46
1984.3 6.26 5.18 -1.07 -0.92 -0.08 0.01 -0.61 0.54 -1.06
1984.4 6.64 6.35 -0.30 0.35 0.14 -0.01 -0.58 -0.14 -0.25
1985.1 6.48 6.34 -0.14 0.22 0.26 -0.03 -0.45 -0.13 -0.14
1985.2 5.75 5.62 -0.13 0.22 0.41 -0.07 -0.52 -0.14 -0.10
1985.3 5.54 4.51 -1.03 -0.59 0.35 -0.14 -0.60 0.01 -0.96
1985.4 4.87 4.33 -0.54 -0.15 0.31 -0.21 -0.55 0.10 -0.49
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1986.1 4.36 4.28 -0.08 0.53 0.08 -0.18 -0.61 0.13 -0.04
1986.2 3.68 3.67 0.00 0.78 -0.08 -0.18 -0.70 0.18 0.00
1986.3 3.67 4.32 0.65 1.31 -0.10 -0.18 -0.56 0.20 0.66
1986.4 3.50 4.84 1.33 1.98 -0.14 -0.18 -0.44 0.17 1.40
1987.1 3.37 4.59 1.22 1.77 -0.15 -0.19 -0.21 0.01 1.24
1987.2 3.49 3.79 0.30 1.13 -0.21 -0.15 -0.17 -0.24 0.37
1987.3 3.16 2.72 -0.44 0.90 -0.42 -0.11 -0.06 -0.66 -0.34
1987.4 3.66 3.22 -0.43 0.78 -0.22 -0.08 -0.11 -0.72 -0.35
1988.1 3.42 3.29 -0.13 0.99 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 -0.85 -0.04
1988.2 3.87 3.50 -0.37 0.51 -0.05 -0.03 0.34 -1.13 -0.36
1988.3 3.65 2.43 -1.22 -0.16 -0.19 -0.03 0.40 -1.23 -1.20
1988.4 4.07 2.69 -1.38 -0.60 0.03 -0.02 0.41 -1.20 -1.38
1989.1 4.25 2.51 -1.75 -0.81 0.31 -0.01 0.26 -1.50 -1.75
1989.2 4.03 2.16 -1.87 -0.82 0.28 0.00 0.12 -1.47 -1.89
1989.3 3.92 2.22 -1.70 -0.84 0.34 0.01 0.08 -1.33 -1.75
1989.4 3.16 1.09 -2.07 -0.70 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 -1.18 -2.03
1990.1 3.50 1.89 -1.61 -0.43 -0.13 -0.01 -0.07 -0.90 -1.53
1990.2 2.98 1.30 -1.68 -0.40 -0.14 0.02 -0.21 -0.85 -1.58
1990.3 2.71 1.38 -1.33 -0.18 -0.18 0.03 -0.09 -0.85 -1.27
1990.4 1.65 0.95 -0.70 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.66 -0.65
1991.1 0.88 1.35 0.47 0.87 0.09 0.07 -0.07 -0.48 0.48
1991.2 0.88 1.04 0.16 0.28 0.16 0.10 -0.14 -0.21 0.20
1991.3 0.76 1.23 0.46 0.32 0.30 0.17 -0.01 -0.34 0.44
1991.4 0.87 1.31 0.43 0.39 0.32 0.20 -0.09 -0.42 0.40
1992.1 0.81 0.87 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.17 -0.22 -0.16 0.04
1992.2 1.17 1.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.11
1992.3 1.66 1.23 -0.43 0.28 -0.24 0.11 -0.33 -0.22 -0.40
1992.4 2.61 1.97 -0.64 0.49 -0.06 0.07 -0.87 -0.24 -0.62
1993.1 2.93 2.68 -0.25 0.43 0.09 0.10 -0.58 -0.26 -0.21
1993.2 2.86 3.39 0.53 0.72 -0.02 0.10 -0.31 0.08 0.57
1993.3 2.87 3.75 0.87 0.71 -0.02 0.09 -0.20 0.30 0.89
1993.4 3.32 4.40 1.08 0.76 0.13 0.10 -0.31 0.38 1.06
1994.1 3.31 4.31 1.00 0.75 -0.03 0.13 -0.28 0.42 1.00
1994.2 3.49 4.07 0.59 0.81 -0.13 0.10 -0.35 0.17 0.60
1994.3 3.27 3.79 0.52 0.98 -0.14 0.10 -0.48 0.07 0.54
1994.4 3.31 3.25 -0.06 0.40 0.05 0.09 -0.40 -0.19 -0.05
1995.1 3.39 3.54 0.15 0.67 0.10 0.05 -0.22 -0.45 0.14
1995.2 3.22 3.90 0.68 1.35 0.06 0.05 -0.23 -0.53 0.70
1995.3 3.37 3.53 0.15 1.11 0.04 0.07 -0.08 -0.95 0.19
1995.4 3.06 3.59 0.53 1.32 0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.85 0.54
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1996.1 2.90 2.07 -0.83 0.23 -0.16 0.06 -0.01 -0.96 -0.84
1996.2 3.07 1.77 -1.30 -0.09 -0.36 0.06 -0.10 -0.78 -1.26
1996.3 3.21 1.66 -1.55 -0.34 -0.44 0.05 -0.24 -0.48 -1.45
1996.4 3.21 1.45 -1.76 -0.21 -0.52 0.04 -0.32 -0.64 -1.65
1997.1 3.47 1.70 -1.77 -0.05 -0.46 0.04 -0.40 -0.78 -1.66
1997.2 4.16 2.20 -1.95 0.17 -0.41 0.03 -0.62 -1.05 -1.89
1997.3 4.38 2.77 -1.61 0.26 -0.35 0.03 -0.64 -0.88 -1.58
1997.4 4.38 3.16 -1.22 0.67 -0.35 0.02 -0.64 -0.89 -1.18
1998.1 4.59 3.27 -1.32 0.69 -0.42 0.02 -0.72 -0.85 -1.28
1998.2 4.08 2.79 -1.30 0.71 -0.57 0.00 -0.78 -0.60 -1.24
1998.3 4.25 2.68 -1.56 0.46 -0.75 -0.01 -0.79 -0.42 -1.51
1998.4 4.43 2.94 -1.49 0.08 -0.74 -0.04 -0.92 0.19 -1.43
1999.1 4.47 2.89 -1.58 -0.10 -0.85 -0.06 -0.89 0.37 -1.53
1999.2 4.11 2.83 -1.28 -0.62 -0.56 -0.07 -0.76 0.77 -1.23
1999.3 4.07 3.22 -0.84 -0.43 -0.45 -0.08 -0.71 0.87 -0.80
1999.4 4.60 3.02 -1.58 -0.84 -0.52 -0.09 -0.63 0.56 -1.52
2000.1 4.16 3.45 -0.71 -0.27 -0.30 -0.08 -0.31 0.35 -0.62
2000.2 4.63 3.41 -1.23 -0.29 -0.52 -0.08 -0.17 -0.11 -1.16
2000.3 3.97 2.30 -1.67 0.18 -1.16 -0.08 0.00 -0.47 -1.53
2000.4 3.46 2.56 -0.90 -0.02 -0.64 -0.09 0.04 -0.13 -0.84
2001.1 2.96 1.89 -1.07 -0.27 -0.55 -0.11 0.10 -0.19 -1.02
2001.2 2.70 2.10 -0.60 -0.46 -0.17 -0.13 0.01 0.20 -0.55
2001.3 1.92 1.52 -0.41 -0.86 -0.22 -0.15 -0.13 0.97 -0.39
2001.4 1.23 2.13 0.91 -1.10 0.75 -0.18 -0.27 1.68 0.88
2002.1 1.44 3.20 1.76 -0.78 1.14 -0.20 -0.46 2.08 1.78
2002.2 0.93 2.96 2.03 -0.64 1.01 -0.19 -0.52 2.35 2.01
2002.3 1.28 3.93 2.65 -0.30 1.10 -0.16 -0.61 2.59 2.62
2002.4 1.05 3.62 2.57 -0.01 0.87 -0.15 -0.62 2.46 2.53
2003.1 1.26 3.47 2.21 -0.01 0.59 -0.15 -0.52 2.32 2.21
2003.2 1.54 3.07 1.53 -0.78 0.93 -0.14 -0.34 1.90 1.56
2003.3 2.64 2.44 -0.19 -1.42 0.43 -0.12 -0.21 1.15 -0.18
2003.4 2.77 2.78 0.01 -1.07 0.69 -0.13 0.01 0.46 -0.03
2004.1 2.80 2.86 0.06 -0.82 0.54 -0.13 0.09 0.28 -0.04
2004.2 2.96 2.59 -0.37 -0.51 -0.04 -0.15 0.01 0.30 -0.40
2004.3 3.11 2.42 -0.69 -0.06 -0.67 -0.16 0.03 0.20 -0.66
2004.4 3.41 2.76 -0.65 0.16 -0.57 -0.18 0.10 -0.12 -0.61
2005.1 3.64 2.36 -1.27 0.30 -0.79 -0.23 0.03 -0.49 -1.18
2005.2 3.53 2.11 -1.42 0.01 -0.55 -0.24 0.16 -0.77 -1.38
2005.3 3.08 1.22 -1.87 -0.68 -0.53 -0.25 0.22 -0.57 -1.81
2005.4 2.91 2.12 -0.79 -0.31 -0.29 -0.26 0.34 -0.22 -0.75
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2006.1 3.15 1.79 -1.36 -0.69 -0.34 -0.28 0.28 -0.29 -1.32
2006.2 3.05 1.17 -1.88 -0.96 -0.48 -0.27 0.26 -0.36 -1.82
2006.3 2.69 0.58 -2.11 -0.97 -0.65 -0.23 0.27 -0.44 -2.02
2006.4 2.56 1.25 -1.31 -0.42 -0.41 -0.17 0.20 -0.46 -1.26
2007.1 2.19 0.72 -1.47 -0.61 -0.50 -0.08 0.18 -0.42 -1.42
2007.2 2.46 0.87 -1.59 -0.77 -0.52 0.02 0.06 -0.37 -1.58
2007.3 2.57 0.64 -1.93 -0.69 -0.46 0.10 -0.03 -0.79 -1.88
2007.4 2.38 1.07 -1.31 -0.21 -0.46 0.16 0.01 -0.79 -1.28
2008.1 1.89 1.75 -0.14 0.27 -0.29 0.22 0.17 -0.54 -0.17
2008.2 1.91 1.74 -0.17 0.34 -0.34 0.26 0.26 -0.68 -0.16
2008.3 1.74 2.56 0.82 0.96 -0.13 0.35 0.43 -0.76 0.85
2008.4 0.73 4.00 3.27 1.74 0.31 0.50 0.66 0.10 3.30
2009.1 -0.07 4.52 4.60 1.90 0.75 0.60 0.52 0.96 4.74
• See notes to Table 1.
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1955.4 1.77 0.89 -0.88 -0.79 -0.11 0.01 0.28 -0.15 -0.76
1956.1 2.15 1.01 -1.14 -0.76 -0.15 -0.02 0.44 -0.50 -0.99
1956.2 2.40 2.02 -0.38 -0.56 -0.16 -0.03 0.46 -0.01 -0.30
1956.3 2.91 3.51 0.60 0.64 -0.08 -0.02 0.47 -0.31 0.70
1956.4 3.05 3.68 0.63 0.62 -0.09 -0.01 0.46 -0.26 0.72
1957.1 3.49 4.22 0.73 1.08 -0.16 -0.02 0.27 -0.34 0.83
1957.2 3.63 4.25 0.62 1.28 -0.04 -0.01 0.20 -0.75 0.68
1957.3 3.56 3.27 -0.28 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.19 -0.49 -0.24
1957.4 3.02 2.97 -0.05 0.37 0.09 -0.01 0.23 -0.65 0.04
1958.1 3.03 4.16 1.13 1.03 0.22 0.01 0.31 -0.42 1.15
1958.2 2.92 5.29 2.37 1.64 0.17 0.02 0.49 0.09 2.41
1958.3 2.62 4.95 2.33 1.24 0.14 0.03 0.64 0.32 2.36
1958.4 2.69 6.00 3.31 1.55 0.27 0.02 0.76 0.65 3.26
1959.1 2.05 4.86 2.81 0.62 0.10 0.01 0.86 1.13 2.73
1959.2 1.70 4.35 2.65 0.62 0.11 0.01 0.95 0.88 2.58
1959.3 1.57 3.64 2.07 0.51 -0.08 0.01 0.91 0.73 2.07
1959.4 1.73 2.98 1.25 0.15 -0.17 0.00 0.76 0.52 1.27
1960.1 1.41 0.80 -0.61 -0.83 -0.15 -0.02 0.51 -0.03 -0.52
1960.2 1.41 0.12 -1.29 -1.23 -0.14 -0.02 0.37 -0.15 -1.16
1960.3 1.27 0.74 -0.53 -0.41 0.02 0.00 0.25 -0.32 -0.47
1960.4 1.18 1.32 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.01 0.23 -0.48 0.21
1961.1 1.18 2.51 1.33 1.33 0.13 -0.03 0.30 -0.35 1.39
1961.2 1.27 1.58 0.30 0.21 0.15 -0.01 0.30 -0.30 0.34
1961.3 1.28 1.43 0.16 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.37 -0.26 0.18
1961.4 1.27 1.88 0.60 0.45 0.15 0.00 0.47 -0.44 0.63
1962.1 1.38 2.81 1.44 0.91 -0.05 0.02 0.49 0.06 1.44
1962.2 1.24 2.55 1.31 0.52 -0.10 0.00 0.52 0.34 1.29
1962.3 1.20 1.81 0.62 0.16 -0.26 0.01 0.61 0.13 0.64
1962.4 1.19 2.52 1.33 0.66 -0.03 -0.01 0.54 0.18 1.35
1963.1 1.19 2.71 1.52 0.64 0.15 -0.02 0.59 0.12 1.48
1963.2 1.19 3.10 1.90 1.21 0.13 -0.01 0.53 0.04 1.90
1963.3 1.13 3.72 2.60 2.04 0.18 0.01 0.47 -0.07 2.63
1963.4 1.35 4.68 3.33 2.53 0.31 0.01 0.45 -0.01 3.30
1964.1 1.16 3.53 2.37 1.99 0.21 0.02 0.24 -0.08 2.37
1964.2 1.27 3.14 1.88 1.78 -0.36 0.01 0.21 0.22 1.87
1964.3 1.33 2.18 0.86 1.26 -0.35 0.01 0.10 -0.14 0.88
1964.4 1.41 2.91 1.51 1.77 -0.04 0.02 0.15 -0.36 1.55
1965.1 1.56 2.61 1.06 1.26 0.00 0.03 0.18 -0.38 1.08
1965.2 1.68 3.21 1.54 1.18 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.14 1.53
1965.3 1.78 2.69 0.92 0.88 0.04 0.03 0.21 -0.21 0.96
1965.4 1.71 2.58 0.87 0.77 -0.06 0.03 0.24 -0.05 0.93
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1966.1 1.90 3.07 1.17 0.83 -0.03 0.01 0.29 0.10 1.19
1966.2 2.18 2.69 0.51 0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.26 0.13 0.52
1966.3 2.51 2.87 0.36 0.15 -0.01 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.37
1966.4 2.74 3.36 0.62 0.24 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.61
1967.1 2.70 4.01 1.31 1.46 0.07 0.03 0.25 -0.52 1.29
1967.2 2.76 4.96 2.20 1.84 -0.03 0.02 0.14 0.23 2.21
1967.3 3.06 5.00 1.94 1.75 0.11 0.00 0.18 -0.09 1.95
1967.4 3.30 5.81 2.51 1.76 0.23 0.01 0.28 0.20 2.47
1968.1 3.55 5.29 1.74 1.22 0.12 -0.03 0.34 0.08 1.73
1968.2 3.66 4.82 1.16 0.49 0.00 0.01 0.42 0.27 1.19
1968.3 3.62 3.96 0.34 0.27 -0.27 -0.02 0.39 0.04 0.40
1968.4 3.87 3.68 -0.19 -0.39 -0.21 -0.01 0.38 0.07 -0.16
1969.1 4.19 3.72 -0.46 -0.78 -0.08 -0.02 0.35 0.08 -0.45
1969.2 4.57 4.01 -0.56 -0.72 -0.13 -0.03 0.26 0.10 -0.51
1969.3 4.80 3.83 -0.97 -0.85 -0.09 -0.04 0.18 -0.12 -0.91
1969.4 4.92 3.51 -1.40 -1.29 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.06 -1.33
1970.1 5.07 3.17 -1.90 -1.53 -0.24 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -1.81
1970.2 5.24 2.96 -2.28 -2.19 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -2.23
1970.3 5.14 3.05 -2.10 -2.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.16 0.10 -2.10
1970.4 5.09 3.86 -1.23 -1.50 0.49 0.00 -0.21 -0.04 -1.26
1971.1 5.32 2.24 -3.08 -2.41 0.44 0.01 -0.39 -0.84 -3.20
1971.2 5.33 2.95 -2.39 -2.49 0.40 0.01 -0.50 0.08 -2.50
1971.3 5.11 2.66 -2.45 -2.20 0.33 0.00 -0.58 -0.04 -2.50
1971.4 4.81 3.07 -1.74 -1.59 0.22 0.01 -0.46 0.01 -1.81
1972.1 4.91 2.58 -2.34 -2.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.51 0.05 -2.38
1972.2 4.51 1.85 -2.66 -2.01 -0.33 0.01 -0.58 0.17 -2.74
1972.3 4.60 2.97 -1.63 -1.08 -0.24 -0.02 -0.48 0.16 -1.67
1972.4 4.62 3.43 -1.19 -0.67 -0.13 -0.02 -0.57 0.16 -1.23
1973.1 4.47 3.31 -1.16 -0.73 -0.03 -0.02 -0.50 0.10 -1.17
1973.2 4.59 2.97 -1.62 -0.59 -0.10 -0.03 -0.88 -0.03 -1.62
1973.3 5.07 2.99 -2.08 -0.67 -0.19 -0.04 -1.15 -0.03 -2.08
1973.4 5.71 3.13 -2.59 -0.34 -0.09 -0.05 -1.53 -0.63 -2.64
1974.1 5.87 3.27 -2.60 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -2.14 -0.36 -2.63
1974.2 6.78 2.77 -4.01 -0.46 -0.04 -0.05 -2.82 -0.75 -4.13
1974.3 7.82 3.15 -4.66 -0.62 0.05 -0.02 -3.46 -0.68 -4.73
1974.4 8.69 4.57 -4.13 -0.16 0.42 0.04 -3.91 -0.63 -4.25
1975.1 9.36 5.21 -4.15 -0.17 0.38 0.06 -4.17 -0.29 -4.18
1975.2 9.27 5.74 -3.53 -0.15 0.35 0.11 -3.79 -0.05 -3.53
1975.3 9.17 6.49 -2.68 0.26 0.56 0.19 -3.60 -0.07 -2.66
1975.4 9.09 7.45 -1.64 0.62 0.32 0.23 -3.04 0.26 -1.61
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1976.1 8.68 7.96 -0.72 0.17 0.24 0.13 -1.64 0.31 -0.79
1976.2 7.99 8.30 0.30 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.61 0.68 0.17
1976.3 7.17 7.46 0.29 0.43 -0.24 -0.02 -0.16 0.25 0.26
1976.4 6.56 6.99 0.43 0.23 -0.26 -0.02 0.17 0.36 0.48
1977.1 6.14 6.50 0.37 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.18 0.34 0.46
1977.2 6.17 6.09 -0.09 -0.22 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.06
1977.3 5.88 5.43 -0.45 0.30 -0.15 -0.02 -0.50 -0.10 -0.47
1977.4 6.08 5.78 -0.30 0.32 -0.10 -0.03 -0.68 0.14 -0.34
1978.1 6.26 6.02 -0.24 0.35 0.01 -0.05 -0.72 0.11 -0.30
1978.2 6.66 5.50 -1.16 -0.62 0.05 -0.02 -0.77 0.12 -1.25
1978.3 6.80 5.04 -1.76 -1.28 0.06 -0.05 -0.79 0.17 -1.89
1978.4 6.96 5.37 -1.60 -0.95 0.13 -0.06 -0.87 0.12 -1.63
1979.1 7.03 5.43 -1.59 -0.71 0.02 -0.07 -0.74 -0.12 -1.62
1979.2 7.56 6.05 -1.51 -0.67 0.03 -0.05 -0.78 -0.12 -1.59
1979.3 8.07 5.37 -2.70 -1.41 -0.02 -0.05 -1.05 -0.21 -2.74
1979.4 7.94 5.30 -2.64 -0.50 -0.07 -0.04 -1.47 -0.62 -2.71
1980.1 8.29 5.10 -3.19 -0.42 -0.17 -0.05 -1.88 -0.74 -3.25
1980.2 8.50 6.31 -2.19 0.39 -0.13 -0.04 -2.17 -0.20 -2.15
1980.3 8.83 6.25 -2.59 0.35 -0.08 -0.04 -2.44 -0.33 -2.55
1980.4 9.17 6.24 -2.93 0.20 -0.15 -0.05 -2.76 -0.23 -2.98
1981.1 9.61 6.22 -3.38 -0.19 -0.14 -0.01 -2.77 -0.33 -3.45
1981.2 9.30 6.23 -3.07 -0.01 -0.17 0.01 -2.50 -0.47 -3.14
1981.3 9.09 6.13 -2.95 -0.71 -0.14 0.01 -1.88 -0.31 -3.03
1981.4 9.03 6.35 -2.68 -1.53 -0.14 0.00 -1.26 0.13 -2.80
1982.1 8.60 6.44 -2.16 -1.90 -0.23 0.00 -0.51 0.32 -2.32
1982.2 8.06 5.44 -2.62 -3.16 -0.11 0.01 -0.08 0.54 -2.80
1982.3 7.61 7.12 -0.49 -1.53 0.06 0.02 0.31 0.56 -0.58
1982.4 6.72 7.58 0.85 -0.56 0.21 -0.01 0.58 0.58 0.81
1983.1 5.80 7.24 1.44 -0.59 0.24 -0.05 1.00 0.83 1.43
1983.2 5.24 7.13 1.89 -0.50 0.20 0.01 1.17 0.98 1.86
1983.3 4.81 6.14 1.33 -0.59 0.05 0.02 0.95 0.91 1.34
1983.4 4.26 5.06 0.80 -1.36 0.08 0.02 1.04 1.00 0.78
1984.1 4.20 4.72 0.52 -1.20 -0.05 0.04 1.08 0.66 0.53
1984.2 4.02 4.22 0.20 -1.29 -0.11 0.03 0.90 0.70 0.23
1984.3 3.70 3.28 -0.42 -1.48 -0.09 0.01 0.84 0.35 -0.38
1984.4 3.48 3.78 0.30 -0.48 0.02 0.00 0.84 -0.01 0.37
1985.1 3.64 3.82 0.18 -0.56 0.09 0.00 0.71 -0.04 0.20
1985.2 3.51 3.75 0.23 -0.60 0.18 -0.02 0.79 -0.08 0.27
1985.3 3.25 3.07 -0.17 -1.02 0.17 -0.05 0.88 -0.08 -0.09
1985.4 3.19 3.62 0.44 -0.37 0.16 -0.08 0.81 -0.02 0.50
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1986.1 2.81 3.63 0.82 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.84 0.03 0.88
1986.2 2.64 3.62 0.99 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.99 0.06 1.00
1986.3 2.53 3.44 0.91 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.81 0.10 0.92
1986.4 2.57 3.76 1.18 0.49 -0.04 -0.07 0.68 0.16 1.22
1987.1 2.38 3.64 1.26 1.02 -0.05 -0.08 0.30 0.06 1.25
1987.2 2.37 3.17 0.80 0.78 -0.08 -0.06 0.21 -0.02 0.83
1987.3 2.53 2.86 0.33 0.75 -0.19 -0.05 0.06 -0.18 0.40
1987.4 2.58 3.41 0.83 1.00 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 -0.17 0.90
1988.1 2.75 3.68 0.94 1.18 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.16 1.00
1988.2 2.97 2.99 0.02 0.89 -0.03 -0.02 -0.53 -0.28 0.03
1988.3 3.25 2.61 -0.63 0.44 -0.14 -0.01 -0.57 -0.34 -0.62
1988.4 3.25 2.50 -0.75 0.17 -0.04 -0.01 -0.55 -0.33 -0.76
1989.1 3.45 2.85 -0.60 0.19 0.13 0.00 -0.39 -0.50 -0.58
1989.2 3.67 3.23 -0.43 0.11 0.13 0.00 -0.21 -0.48 -0.44
1989.3 3.65 3.38 -0.27 0.09 0.21 0.00 -0.13 -0.48 -0.31
1989.4 3.63 3.21 -0.42 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.45 -0.39
1990.1 3.81 3.83 0.03 0.24 -0.04 0.00 0.13 -0.26 0.07
1990.2 3.91 4.06 0.14 0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.37 -0.25 0.22
1990.3 3.80 3.65 -0.15 0.15 -0.09 0.01 0.12 -0.29 -0.10
1990.4 3.80 3.72 -0.07 0.30 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.27 -0.02
1991.1 3.82 4.16 0.33 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.15 -0.24 0.36
1991.2 3.66 3.88 0.22 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.31 -0.07 0.25
1991.3 3.65 3.78 0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.06 0.12 -0.11 0.10
1991.4 3.58 3.90 0.33 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.17 -0.13 0.30
1992.1 3.29 3.62 0.34 -0.23 0.08 0.07 0.39 0.01 0.31
1992.2 2.96 2.94 -0.01 -0.30 0.06 0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.08
1992.3 2.73 2.95 0.22 -0.09 -0.12 0.04 0.45 -0.05 0.24
1992.4 2.62 3.33 0.71 -0.25 -0.05 0.02 1.11 -0.10 0.73
1993.1 2.41 2.58 0.16 -0.50 0.03 0.03 0.82 -0.17 0.22
1993.2 2.36 2.49 0.12 -0.30 -0.01 0.03 0.49 -0.04 0.17
1993.3 2.23 2.51 0.28 -0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.36 0.01 0.31
1993.4 2.22 3.04 0.81 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.51 0.10 0.80
1994.1 2.21 3.43 1.22 0.55 0.01 0.05 0.48 0.12 1.20
1994.2 2.16 3.36 1.20 0.60 -0.05 0.04 0.54 0.07 1.20
1994.3 2.26 3.38 1.12 0.37 -0.08 0.03 0.68 0.12 1.13
1994.4 2.23 3.00 0.77 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.59 0.06 0.77
1995.1 2.16 2.54 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.36 -0.04 0.38
1995.2 2.06 2.91 0.85 0.57 0.02 0.01 0.35 -0.08 0.87
1995.3 2.08 2.81 0.73 0.75 0.03 0.02 0.20 -0.23 0.77
1995.4 2.05 3.24 1.18 1.17 0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.19 1.19
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1996.1 2.05 1.74 -0.31 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.27 -0.32
1996.2 2.04 1.95 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.19 -0.24 -0.07
1996.3 1.87 1.77 -0.10 -0.26 -0.11 0.02 0.45 -0.13 -0.03
1996.4 1.90 1.79 -0.12 -0.32 -0.17 0.01 0.53 -0.11 -0.05
1997.1 1.91 1.68 -0.22 -0.50 -0.16 0.01 0.65 -0.16 -0.15
1997.2 1.81 2.03 0.22 -0.39 -0.14 0.01 1.00 -0.20 0.29
1997.3 1.74 2.20 0.46 -0.33 -0.11 0.01 1.02 -0.10 0.50
1997.4 1.67 2.23 0.56 -0.19 -0.08 0.01 1.03 -0.17 0.60
1998.1 1.49 2.28 0.79 0.01 -0.08 0.01 1.14 -0.23 0.84
1998.2 1.37 2.08 0.71 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 1.25 -0.28 0.75
1998.3 1.40 1.81 0.41 -0.29 -0.17 0.00 1.27 -0.34 0.47
1998.4 1.31 1.98 0.67 -0.41 -0.21 -0.01 1.42 -0.06 0.74
1999.1 1.19 1.58 0.39 -0.61 -0.29 -0.01 1.40 -0.03 0.46
1999.2 1.29 1.51 0.22 -0.90 -0.17 -0.01 1.21 0.14 0.27
1999.3 1.29 1.84 0.55 -0.66 -0.12 -0.02 1.13 0.25 0.59
1999.4 1.34 1.66 0.32 -0.68 -0.14 -0.03 1.01 0.20 0.37
2000.1 1.67 1.68 0.02 -0.63 -0.02 -0.02 0.56 0.18 0.06
2000.2 1.80 1.77 -0.03 -0.31 -0.06 -0.02 0.34 0.05 0.00
2000.3 1.88 1.23 -0.65 -0.22 -0.35 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.57
2000.4 1.91 1.69 -0.22 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.19
2001.1 2.11 1.24 -0.87 -0.33 -0.19 -0.02 -0.18 -0.12 -0.85
2001.2 2.34 1.89 -0.44 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 -0.42
2001.3 2.35 1.82 -0.53 -0.39 -0.22 -0.03 0.21 -0.08 -0.51
2001.4 2.39 2.66 0.28 -0.34 0.10 -0.04 0.52 0.02 0.27
2002.1 2.12 3.20 1.08 -0.08 0.23 -0.04 0.85 0.12 1.09
2002.2 2.08 2.89 0.81 -0.67 0.25 -0.04 0.89 0.38 0.80
2002.3 2.01 3.49 1.48 -0.42 0.32 -0.04 1.05 0.58 1.48
2002.4 2.08 3.51 1.43 -0.47 0.22 -0.03 1.08 0.62 1.42
2003.1 2.07 3.33 1.26 -0.26 0.08 -0.03 0.88 0.59 1.26
2003.2 1.83 2.70 0.88 -0.43 0.24 -0.03 0.66 0.47 0.90
2003.3 1.90 1.99 0.09 -0.55 0.05 -0.03 0.41 0.23 0.11
2003.4 1.92 1.61 -0.31 -0.56 0.20 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.32
2004.1 2.20 1.50 -0.70 -0.85 0.25 -0.02 -0.23 0.12 -0.74
2004.2 2.49 1.68 -0.81 -1.06 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.18 -0.83
2004.3 2.59 1.56 -1.03 -0.97 -0.12 -0.02 -0.07 0.17 -1.02
2004.4 2.71 1.50 -1.21 -0.92 -0.10 -0.03 -0.24 0.07 -1.21
2005.1 2.82 1.89 -0.93 -0.58 -0.20 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.88
2005.2 2.92 2.06 -0.86 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 -0.33 -0.18 -0.84
2005.3 3.17 2.21 -0.96 -0.11 -0.13 -0.04 -0.48 -0.18 -0.95
2005.4 3.37 2.30 -1.06 -0.23 -0.04 -0.04 -0.69 -0.04 -1.05
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2006.1 3.34 2.39 -0.96 -0.31 -0.04 -0.05 -0.56 0.00 -0.97
2006.2 3.22 2.54 -0.68 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.53 -0.01 -0.68
2006.3 3.28 2.71 -0.57 0.27 -0.14 -0.06 -0.55 -0.07 -0.55
2006.4 3.14 3.28 0.14 0.68 -0.06 -0.06 -0.37 -0.04 0.15
2007.1 3.17 3.11 -0.06 0.51 -0.09 -0.03 -0.38 -0.05 -0.05
2007.2 3.15 3.53 0.39 0.75 -0.10 -0.01 -0.21 -0.05 0.37
2007.3 2.84 3.60 0.77 0.98 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.80
2007.4 2.71 3.60 0.88 1.14 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.90
2008.1 2.59 3.95 1.36 1.78 -0.04 0.03 -0.37 -0.05 1.35
2008.2 2.37 3.87 1.51 2.10 -0.11 0.02 -0.42 -0.07 1.52
2008.3 2.51 3.69 1.19 2.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.60 -0.15 1.22
2008.4 2.31 3.66 1.34 2.27 -0.03 0.07 -0.83 -0.16 1.33
2009.1 2.14 3.72 1.58 2.22 0.03 0.09 -0.55 -0.25 1.54
• See notes to Table 2.
44The US versus DSGE Models
I have argued elsewhere that a model like the US model is a better approximation
of the economy than are currently popular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models. The most extensive discussion is in Fair (2007, Section 2). Ta-
ble A3 is a slightly modi￿ed version of Table 2 in this paper; it summarizes some
of the main points.
The reference in the last point in Table A3 presents a comparison in terms of
outside sample root mean squared errors of the US model and three models in the
DSGEtradition. ThiscomparisonisbasedonresultsinIreland(2004), DelNegro,
Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2006), and Fair (2004). The results show that
the US model is much more accurate, especially regarding real output. This is
perhaps not surprising since DSGE models leave out many ￿rst order effects and
are based on assumptions like labor market clearing and rational expectations that
do not seem realistic. As listed in Table A3, ￿rst order effects that are usually left
out of DSGE models include 1) no disaggregation of demand into consumption
and investment components, 2) usually no government and foreign sectors, 3) no
stock effects and wealth effects, and 4) usually no wage equation. The US model
disaggregates demand into three categories of consumption, three categories of
investment, and imports. Exports are endogenous in the MC model. Both federal
and state and local governments are in the US model. Lagged stock effects play
a major role: durable goods stock, housing stock, capital stock, inventory stock.
Wealth effects are very important, as has been seen in this paper.
Most DSGE models have the feature that a positive price shock with the nom-
45inal interest rate held constant is explosive or indeterminate. This property has
important implications for monetary policy. In the US model, on the other hand, a
positive price shock is contractionary, as discussed in Section 2 of this paper. This
feature seems strongly supported by the data in the tests that I have done. If true,
then DSGE models that have the opposite feature are likely to be misleading for
most monetary policy analyses.
The US model is completely estimated and has been extensively tested￿see
Fair (2004, Chapter 2). Not all tests yield positive results, but overall the model
seems to be a reasonable approximation. In particular the model does fairly well
on coef￿cient stability tests. If the Lucas critique were a problem, it seems likely
that more stability hypotheses would be rejected. Also, the Lucas critique is
not a problem if expectations are not rational, and tests that I have performed of
the rational expectations hypothesis￿again see Fair (2004, Chapter 2)￿are not
generallysupportiveofthehypothesis. TheUSmodelhasthefeaturethatall￿ows
of funds among the sectors are accounted for.
Micro theory is behind the speci￿cation of household and ￿rm behavior. The
estimated equations are meant to be approximations to decision equations that
result from optimization problems. Theory is used to decide what is on the left
hand and right hand sides of the estimated equations. People using the DSGE
methodology don’t like this way of using theory because it is not as tight as that
used in DSGE work. It is considered ad hoc. But my view is that this is exactly
the way theory should be used. Any more restrictive or rigorous use of theory is
likely to push beyond what the data can tell us. Macroeconomic data are highly
aggregated, and there is a limit to what one can expect to learn from the data.
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DSGE Models versus the US Model
Property DSGE Models US Model
Intertemporal optimization? Yes. Yes.
Rational expectations? Yes. No.
Imperfect competition? Yes. Yes.
Costly price adjustment? Yes. No.
Estimation. Parameters of the theoretical
model are calibrated or esti-
mated.
Thetheoreticalmodelisused
to guide the speci￿cation
of the econometric model,
which is then estimated. No
calibration for econometric
model.








Government sector? Usually not. Yes.
Foreign sector? Usually not. Yes.




Wealth effects? No. Yes, on the three categories
of consumption.
Wage equation? Usually not. Yes, separately estimated
wage and price equations.
Real versus nominal interest
rate effects.
Real effects imposed. Tested, where nominal inter-
est rates generally dominate.
Effects of a positive price
shock with the nominal inter-
est rate held constant.
Explosive or indeterminate. Contractionary.
Lucas critique a problem? No. Not under the assumptions
about expectations.
Long run tradeoff between
in￿ation and output?
No. Lack of tradeoff not tested
because of limited data.
Relationship likely to be
nonlinear.
Accuracy. See Table 1, Fair (2007). See Table 1, Fair (2007).
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